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Kelly, Brian

Community Development and Applied Economics

2013

MS

As the economic 'subsystem becomes an increasingly larger part of the containing global ecosystem, formerly abundant resources become scarce as competition for use increases. There are two types of competition for use. First, different individuals may compete for use of the same rival resources, in the form of ecosystem structure (e.g. timber) or the same function (e.g. the carbon sequestration capacity). Second, there may be competition between market and non-market uses. This latter macro-allocation problem is critical in the analysis of property rights in the Anthropocene. As increasing economic scale creates negative externalities, threatening critical natural capital and its life support functions, the nature of the economic problem must necessarily place increasing emphasis on this macro-allocation of ecosystem structure between ecosystem goods and ecosystem fund-services. The appropriateness of an allocation mechanism for goods and services is a function of the resource characteristics, current institutional arrangements, and transaction, governance, and information costs.
The institution of property rights undergirds any economic system, structuring behavior to achieve economic and social goals. Property rights analysis has historically been characterized by a normative bias in favor of the unitary goal of perpetual economic growth. Recognition of the rising transaction costs in an increasingly full world requires a re-articulation of property rights within the multiple economic goals of sustainable scale, just distribution, and allocative efficiency. The author contextualizes property rights theory within these goals, drawing from various property rights traditions-traditional, institutional, neo-institutional, property theory, and law and economics -- to extend the analysis to ecosystem fund-services. The author concludes that collective property rights over ecosystem fund-services can be legitmately argued, in ex ante terms, as a more appropriate ownership structure.
The development of collective property institutions must take into account the existing institutional context. This context will determine the extent to which collective property rights are realized, as well as their particular form. In 2008, for example, Vermont declared groundwater a public trust resource. The extent of integration of this new property rights institution depends on the level of adaptability in the governance network structure. Adaptive governance will require attention to ecological knowledge generation, integration of that information into an adaptive management strategy, and cross-level interactions that promote institutional flexibility and multi-level governance.
In the second chapter, this thesis presents a case study of the adaptation of Vermont's groundwater governance network to new property rights designations. Utilizing the governance network framework, this thesis identifies critical strategic gaps in the network structure. We found that the regulatory core of the network predominates, but is balance by a strong interest group coalition. A comprehensive strategic planning initiative suggests an increased central leadership role, which will require thoughtful engagement of peripheral network actors. While the regulatory network remains strong, there are several opportunities to improve information flows and leverage additional financial resources. Targeted interventions include the strengthening of the central network administrative organization to improve capacity building as well as how the network aggregates, interprets, and distributes information.