UVM Theses and Dissertations
Format:
Print
Author:
Hall, Thomas
Dept./Program:
History
Year:
2008
Degree:
MA
Abstract:
As World War I approached, the embarrassment of the Boer War signaled a waning British Empire. The legacy imperial policies had a direct impact on British involvement in Iraq, but the Empire's declining sustainability, caused policy decisions to play out with difficulty. Arab Nationalism and the Cold War would also play a role, but the appetite for Empire, offset by decreasing power, had an indelible impression in forming a disparate collection of Ottoman provinces into what would become a leading state in the Arab world. The British presence saw two world wars, a League of Nations Mandate, nominal sovereignty, outright rebellion, in addition to the persistent challenges presented by activity in Palestine- all originating from a temporary military exigency.
Britain lacked the military to exercise control solely through brute force. As a result, in Iraq and elsewhere, some of the very forces that Britain released to keep the Empire intact (i.e. nationalism, democracy) made it more difficult to manage Iraq over time. The contradiction between Britain's introduction to Iraq and its inability to realize Imperial ambitions there shaped the level and nature of its involvement, dictating an approach that borrowed from the imperial principles of ruling from within, social division, economic preferences and minimal military presence.
More committed to the Middle East in World War II than the Nazis, Britain was able to restore relative peace to Iraq but was then faced with a new post-war dilemma. With the Cold War looming, it had to maintain a deterrent force in Iraq while reaffirming Iraqi hopes for true sovereignty despite the presence of 'Imperial' troops. Exclusive British access to Iraqi commercial output would no longer be acceptable, despite Britain's dire need of such an arrangement.
Whether Britain entered Iraq out of military necessary or imperialist adventurism, it controlled Iraq in the only manner it knew- imperialism. Marking the end of the British role in Iraq in 1948 rather than 1958 reflects when the loss of their practical, rather than official, ability to influence Iraqi actions.
Britain lacked the military to exercise control solely through brute force. As a result, in Iraq and elsewhere, some of the very forces that Britain released to keep the Empire intact (i.e. nationalism, democracy) made it more difficult to manage Iraq over time. The contradiction between Britain's introduction to Iraq and its inability to realize Imperial ambitions there shaped the level and nature of its involvement, dictating an approach that borrowed from the imperial principles of ruling from within, social division, economic preferences and minimal military presence.
More committed to the Middle East in World War II than the Nazis, Britain was able to restore relative peace to Iraq but was then faced with a new post-war dilemma. With the Cold War looming, it had to maintain a deterrent force in Iraq while reaffirming Iraqi hopes for true sovereignty despite the presence of 'Imperial' troops. Exclusive British access to Iraqi commercial output would no longer be acceptable, despite Britain's dire need of such an arrangement.
Whether Britain entered Iraq out of military necessary or imperialist adventurism, it controlled Iraq in the only manner it knew- imperialism. Marking the end of the British role in Iraq in 1948 rather than 1958 reflects when the loss of their practical, rather than official, ability to influence Iraqi actions.