UVM Theses and Dissertations
Format:
Print
Author:
Blomerth, Paul M.
Dept./Program:
History
Degree:
MA
Abstract:
On 22 June 1941, Nazi Gennany began its war ofannihilation against the Soviet Union, codenamed Operation Barbarossa. This campaign witnessed the mobilization of all aspects of the German military apparatus for the complete destruction of the Soviet state and people. Over the course of the German invasion and subsequent retreat from the USSR, some of the most brutal crimes took place in the Soviet Union and roughly twenty-five million Soviet soldiers and civilians lost their lives as a result. Following the defeat of Nazi Germany in May 1945, however, most historians-largely because of the Cold War and post-war memoirs published by German officers-were unaware of the special nature of the Barbarossa campaign. They believed that the German army waged a 'clean war' against the USSR, and that it was only the SS and special Einsatzgruppen (action groups) who were involved in war crimes against the Soviet Union.
With the collapse of the USSR and its satellite states between 1989-1991, historians have gained access to new archival information that highlights the German army's involvement in the criminal aspects of the Barbarossa campaign. By examining primary and secondary sources based largely on this new archival information, this study seeks to examine the German army's involvement in the war of annihilation against the Soviet Union. The first chapter focuses on the German army's relationship with the SS and Einsatzgruppen in the Polish and Soviet campaigns, with emphasis on how these organizations learned to work together in combating so-called 'racial-political enemies' of Nazi Germany. The second chapter then turns to the actual atrocities committed by the German army against Soviet Prisoners of War (POWs), partisans, non-Jewish civilians, and Jews. The third chapter examines Nazi racial ideology and how the Nazis indoctrinated the German people. Since the soldiers of the Wehnnacht were drawn from the German population, an analysis of how the Nazis 'educated' Germans is necessary.
Furthennore, without this indoctrination of the German population, further indoctrination of the troops, the barbarization of warfare, racism and antisemitism, and peer pressure could not have been strong forces in motivating German soldiers to commit mass murder. The fourth and final chapter explores what may have motivated German troops to commit mass murder. Over the course of this analysis, four possibilities are analyzed: the indoctrination of the German army; the effects of the barbarization of warfare; the use of antisemitism and racism; and peer pressure. This study highlights the interconnectedness of all of these possible reasons and how it is problematic to look for one primary reason, as some historians have done, for why German soldiers killed innocent men, women, and children during the war against the Soviet Union.
With the collapse of the USSR and its satellite states between 1989-1991, historians have gained access to new archival information that highlights the German army's involvement in the criminal aspects of the Barbarossa campaign. By examining primary and secondary sources based largely on this new archival information, this study seeks to examine the German army's involvement in the war of annihilation against the Soviet Union. The first chapter focuses on the German army's relationship with the SS and Einsatzgruppen in the Polish and Soviet campaigns, with emphasis on how these organizations learned to work together in combating so-called 'racial-political enemies' of Nazi Germany. The second chapter then turns to the actual atrocities committed by the German army against Soviet Prisoners of War (POWs), partisans, non-Jewish civilians, and Jews. The third chapter examines Nazi racial ideology and how the Nazis indoctrinated the German people. Since the soldiers of the Wehnnacht were drawn from the German population, an analysis of how the Nazis 'educated' Germans is necessary.
Furthennore, without this indoctrination of the German population, further indoctrination of the troops, the barbarization of warfare, racism and antisemitism, and peer pressure could not have been strong forces in motivating German soldiers to commit mass murder. The fourth and final chapter explores what may have motivated German troops to commit mass murder. Over the course of this analysis, four possibilities are analyzed: the indoctrination of the German army; the effects of the barbarization of warfare; the use of antisemitism and racism; and peer pressure. This study highlights the interconnectedness of all of these possible reasons and how it is problematic to look for one primary reason, as some historians have done, for why German soldiers killed innocent men, women, and children during the war against the Soviet Union.